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THE PERSISTENCE OF THE ANCIENT REGIME: CUSTOM,
UTILrIY, AND THE COMMON LAW IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
The term "custom" in English jurisprudence has been applied to
such diverse bodies of law as public international law, the custom of
Britain's constitution, the international law of merchants and even the
common law itself.' The judicial doctrine of custom is more precise.
It is the doctrine by which ancient customs practiced by a definite
community in a distinct geographical locale, though contrary to the
common law, are recognized by royal judges to constitute local common law for the land and people of the region.
"Custom" refers at one and the same time to royal judicial doctrine and community praxis.2 It is law that arises from the immemorial usage of the community. At once different from, yet coequal with,
the uniform common law, custom is not created by royal judges: it is
judicially noticed by them. 3 The significance of custom is not merely
that it is law from a time before legal memory, 4 but that it is law "from
below": its origins and legitimacy derive from the praxis of the
community.
While courts have recognized customs as various as the fee
charged for performing marriages5 and the number of ounces in a
1 The term custom has been applied to such diverse categories of law as (1) public
international law, (2) the custom of the constitution, (3) the international law of
merchants (now for the mostly incorporated into the common law) and (4) the common
law itself. H.E. Salt, The Local Ambit of a Custom, in CAMBRIDGE LEGAL ESSAY 279, 279-80
(1926).
2

E.P. THOMPSON, CUSTOMS IN COMMON 97 (1991) ("At the interface between law and

agrarian practice we find custom. Custom itself is the interface, since it may be considered
both as praxis and as law.").
3 CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW iN THE MAKIG 86-87 (1st ed. 1927). Allen states:
[I]f a custom is proved in an English court by satisfactory evidence to exist
and to be observed, the function of the Court is merely to recognize the
custom as operative law. In other words, custom does not derive its validity
from the authority of the Court; even the 'sanction' of the Court amounts
only to formal recognition in case of dispute.
Id. (emphasis omitted). See alsoAlbert Kiralfy, Custom in Mediaeval English Law, 9 J. LEGAL
Hisr. 26, 30-31 (1988). Judicial notice is defined as recognition by the court of "the existence and truth of certain facts ... universally acknowledged as established by common
notoriety." BiAcK's LAW DimroNARY (6th ed. 1990).
4
All customs found valid at law, in theory, had their origin before the time of legal
memory. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
5 Bryant v. Foot, 3 L.R--Q.B. (Ch. 1868) (customary marriage fee unreasonable because claimed amount due could not have existed in 1189).
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pound of butter 6 in ancient market towns, custom most often refers to

local variations of the common law rules of property. In rural areas,
ancient customary practices controlled the inheritance of estates, access to the common for subsistence agriculture and special uses of
private land for business and recreation. Because custom regulates
property, the jurisprudence of custom is fundamentally linked to economic development. Disputes over custom reached the common law
courts when the property right at issue was of such value that a party
7
was willing, or able, to undertake the expense of litigation.
Part I of this Note provides a brief introduction to the history and
traditional common law elements of custom through the eighteenth
century. Common law courts recognized only those customs that were
shown to be ancient, continuous, certain and reasonable. The common law has imposed the same four-part test for centuries, but far
from being legal terms of art, the elements of custom were redefined
by common law courts to accommodate changes in political
economy.8
Part II explores E.P. Thompson's argument that such a change
was effected by common law courts in the eighteenth century.9 As
Thompson sees it, custom disappeared as a meaningful source of law
with the rise of agrarian capitalism and the enclosure movement of
the eighteenth century. Until the abolishment of copyhold in the
early decades of the twentieth century, there were two types of rural
custom: manorial copyhold custom, which attached to customary tenures held of the manor, and "easement custom," which inured to all
inhabitants of a district. Thompson's study of custom in the eighteenth century focuses on inhabitant custom. He identifies the common law as one of the forces that destroyed custom and imposed
capitalist definitions of property rights on traditional agrarian
communities.10
6

Noble v. Durrell, 3 T.R. 271, 100 Eng. Rep. 569 (K.B. 1789) (town custom prescrib-

ing eighteen ounces to a pound superseded by Act of Parliament aimed at uniform weights
and measures).
7

THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 141. Thompson observed:

The English Reports are not packed with cases in which poor commoners
challenged their lords or great landowners in the highest courts of the
land. On occasion freeholders or customary tenants did so, pledging themselves to each other to share the costs. But taking cases upwards to the
courts of Common Pleas or King's Bench was not the cottagers' nor the
labourers' "thing". Unless some party with a substantial interest was involved on their side, their rights were liable to be lost silently and without
contest.
Id.
8

THOMPSON,

9
10

THOMPSON,
THOMPSON,

supra note 2, at 137.
supra note 2.
supra note 2, at 9, 133.
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This Note argues that, contrary to Thompson's assertions, custom
was not destroyed by the common law in the eighteenth century, but
remained a significant source of law throughout the nineteenth and
into the twentieth century. Nineteenth century courts regularly upheld long-standing community rights and usages and overruled those
eighteenth century judgments that vested arbitrary power in manorial
lords. Copyhold custom was universally preserved, as were the customary rights of inhabitants to recreation, traditional markets, and renewable resources-the latter on grounds of their utility.
Part III of the Note examines two developments in the nineteenth century that set the stage for the preservation of custom in
common law courts. This section explores the relationship between
positivist legal theory, utilitarian moral theory, and the jurisprudence
of custom. The section then sets out the Prescription Act, which formalized common law presumptions and contributed to the vitality of
copyhold custom and customs of community access to renewable
resources.
Part IV examines in detail the common law of custom between
1830 and 1910. Section IV.A argues that courts preserved manorial
custom by employing a legal fiction, which characterized the relationship between lord and copyholder as contractual. Courts affirmed
customs that evidenced the consent of the copyholders and would
strike down customs as unreasonable if the consent of the copyholders, in some mythical distant past, could not be inferred. Section IV.B
argues that this fiction was then incorporated into the law of easement
custom.
In the nineteenth century, the jurisprudence of easement custom
was transformed by positivist conceptions of law and a judicial belief
in custom's utility. Courts struck down ancient easement customs on
the grounds that they could not have been promulgated in a definite
jurisdiction, while declaring modem innovations of genuinely ancient
custom reasonable because they served the greater good of the
community.
I
EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF CUSTOM

A.

Defining the Conceptual Framework of the Law of Custom
1.

Custom

Custom is a local exception to the general law of the realm that is
judicially noticed by royal judges as local common law." Local custom
serves as a source of adjudicatory law by virtue of its long and continu11

ALLEN,

supra note 3, at 86-87.
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ous usage. 12 Upon proof of a custom's existence and reasonableness,
the custom is recognized by the common law court as lex loci or local
common law.' 3 Custom, like all common law, can only be abrogated
by parliamentary act.' 4 The term custom is sometimes used to refer to
the positive law of jurisdictions that were historically outside of the
original jurisdiction of the common law courts.' 5 The "custom of
London," for example, was not custom in the sense of ancient usage,
but rather referred to the ordinances that were passed by London's
mayor and aldermen. 16 Most rural custom, however, consisted of
community praxis that had attained the force of law as a result of long
17
use.
Custom is a unique category of law because it is both praxis and
law. The case of Mercer v. Dennei8 illustrates how custom is simultaneously law and praxis. In the town of Walmer, fishermen had long
placed their nets on a strip of land convenient to the sea in order to
dry them after a day's use and to treat them with oils. No one could
say when the practice began, but the elderly men of the community
testified that for as long as they could remember the nets had been
placed on the land to dry.' 9 Hostilities broke out between the owner
of the land and the fishermen when the owner announced his intention to erect buildings on his land. 20 The fishermen went to court
and sought a declaration that all fishermen of the parish were entitled
2
to dry and oil their nets on the defendant's grounds. '
Absent local custom or a long-established easement, the owner of
the land would have had the right to exclude all others from the use
and enjoyment of his property. Local praxis, however, limited the
landowner's right to exclude and gave the community's fishermen not
only the right to go onto the property and spread their nets there, but
also the right to an injunction preventing the owner from building on
his property. In seeking the judicial declaration the fishermen asked
the court to take judicial notice of the custom to dry nets as lex loci, or
12

ALLEN, supra note 3, at 89-91.

13

ALLEN, supra note 3, at 88-102.

14

Hammerton v. Honey, 24 W.R 603, 604 (Ch. 1876) (Jessel, M.R). The court stated

that "[t]he nature of custom being, as it is, local law, you can only get rid of it in the same

way as other local laws are got rid of, namely, by Act of Parliament." Id.
15 Another use of "the term 'custom' is to denote rules that once formed an exceptional body of law, but have been adopted within historical times as part of the Common
Law." FREDERICK PoLLocK, A FIRsT BOOK OFJURISPRUDENCE 284 (5th ed. 1923).
16
Kiralfy, supra note 3, at 33.
supra note 2, at 100-01.

17

THOMPSON,

18
19

Mercer v. Denne, [1904] 2 Ch. 534 (Farwell, J.), affd [1905] 2 Ch. 538 (CA-).
Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 535.

20
21

Id.
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local common law, which granted rights of access to the fishermen
22
and limited the property rights of the landowner.
The court held the custom good. The custom of spreading nets
on the specified land was recognized as the local common law of
Walmer and henceforth it would be recognized by all common law
courts without further proof of the custom. 2 3 In recognizing the cus-

tom, the court did not confer legal status upon the custom, but found
that the custom had legal status by virtue of its lineage. The court did
not look to custom to plumb a good rule, but rather, to determine
whether the communal practice was a source of law. Having obtained
the force of law, the custom, like all common law, could only be abro24
gated by parliamentary act.
2.

The Forms of Rural Custom

Custom was claimed with regard to the land of a particular district.2 5 Rural land customs can be divided into two categories: those
that granted accommodation in another's land (easements) and those
that granted rights to take something out of another's land (profits d
prendre or rights of common).26 Customary profits iLprendre were
claimed with reference to all copyhold land,27 while easement customs
claimed for an entire district and applied to the fluctuating class of
28
persons who lived there.
3.

Common Law Prescription

A doctrine which was closely related to the doctrine of custom
was that of prescription.2 9 Prescriptive rights also arose from long and
continuous usage. 30 Rights by prescription differed from those by custom in that they attached to a juridical person (either natural or corporate) and were created by grant. 3' At common law, prescriptive
22

Id.

23

Id. at 538-39. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.

24
25

Hammerton v. Honey, 24 W.R. 603, 604 (Ch. 1876) (Jessel, M.R.).
ALLEN, supranote 3, at 87.

26

THom&s H. CARSON, PRSCRIMTON AND CUSTOM 90 (1907).

27 Warrick v. Queen's College, Oxford, 10 L.R.-Eq. 105, 121 (1870) ("The rights of
copyhold tenants of a manor depend upon custom which applies to all; and as the right is
one of a base tenure, it may be established by evidence of custom, because custom applies
to all persons in that position.").
28
Salt, supra note 1, at 283.
29 Rowles v. Mason, 2 Brownl. & Golds. 192, 123 Eng. Rep. 892 (C.P. 1612) (Coke,
CJ.).
30 CARSON, supra note 26, at 3 (Prescription is defined as "the doctrine under which
defined persons acquire title to certain purely incorporeal hereditaments, such title resulting from acts of user and lapse of time.").
31
Gateward's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 59b, 60b, 77 Eng. Rep. 344, 345 (K.B. 1607) ("Another
...difference was taken, and agreed, between a prescription which always is alledged (sic)
in the person, and a custom, which always ought to be alledged (sic) in the land: for every
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rights did not need to be immemorial and could be claimed by "lost
grant."32 The lost grant theory allowed a juridical person who could
prove twenty years' use to allege that a grant had been made sometime after 1189, but had been lost.3 3 The lost grant was a legal fiction;
in most, if not all cases, no such grant was ever made. Nevertheless,
the better opinion in the nineteenth century "seems to [have been]
that express evidence [could] not be given to... show that in fact no
34
grant was ever made."
Temporary inhabitants of a district or an unincorporated town
were not permitted to claim rights by grant. In Lockwood v. Wood,3 5 the
defendant in an action for nonpayment of stallage fees for the erection of a booth in the market town pleaded "never indebted" on the
basis of a grant to the inhabitants of Easingwold dated 1646 that exempted them from tolls and stallage. The Court of the Exchequer, on
appeal from the Queen's Bench, held that inhabitants of an unincor36
porated locality could claim the right only by immemorial custom.
Because the right could not be claimed by recent grant (that is by
grant made in the seventeenth century), the case was reheard by ajury
on the claim of custom. Although the jury found for the defendant in
the lower court, on appeal Lord Denman found for the plaintiff on
of the
the ground that the defendant failed to prove the existence
37
custom in 1189 (or anytime prior to the 1646 grant).
B.

History of the Law of Custom

One cannot look to the changed conception of custom in the
nineteenth century without some understanding of what had come
before. The purpose of this section, however, is not to provide an
exhaustive account of custom prior to the nineteenth century.
Rather, it seeks to provide an overview of the law in order to provide
the reader with an understanding of the nature of the rights protected
by custom and the incorporation of those rights into the expanding
jurisdiction of the common law.
prescription ought to have by common intendment a lawful beginning, but otherwise it is
of a custom."); Lockwood v. Wood, 6 Q.B. 50, 64, 115 Eng. Rep. 19, 24 (Ex. Ch. 1844)
(Tindal, CJ.) (holding that the inhabitants of an unincorporated town cannot prescribe
for an easement by grant); CARSON, supra note 26, at 11 ("The most important point... is
that the foundation of common law prescription is the presumption of a grant.").
32
CARSON, supra note 26, at 24.
33
CARSON, supra note 26, at 24.
34
35
36

CARSON, supra note 26, at 25.

6 Q.B. 50, 115 Eng. Rep. 19 (Ex. Ch. 1844) (Tindal, C.J.).
Id. at 64, 115 Eng. Rep. at 24 ("[u]pon referring to the several authorities which
have been cited in support of the validity of such a prescription, it will be found that the
claim by the inhabitants, quA inhabitants, to any easement, wherever it has been allowed,
has been invariably vested on the ground of custom, not on that of prescription").
37 Id. at 67-68, 115 Eng. Rep. at 25-26.
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1.

Custom in Medieval Law: The Autonomy of Local Law

The doctrine of custom, whereby local usages are judicially noticed by the common law court upon proof of their antiquity, continuity, certainty and reasonableness, first appeared in the sixteenth
century. 38 The notion of custom or local community praxis obtaining
the force of law by virtue of common usage, however, is as old as the
common law itself.
In the medieval period, common law courts took judicial notice
of special or local custom because the power to make and enforce law
lay in multiple jurisdictions.3 9 One of the incidents of power granted
by the King to rural vassals and chartered boroughs was the jurisdiction to make law and adjudicate disputes. In rural areas, manorial
customs were established and tried in the lord's court, which was attended by his tenants. In towns, boroughs, and counties granted a
charter by the Crown, customs were recorded in custumals (written
compilations of ajurisdiction's customs) and adjudged by borough or
county courts established by royal franchise.4 0 Custom governed
those areas beyond the original jurisdiction of the common law
courts.

In this context, custom could mean positive law promulgated by a
manorial lord or the burgesses of a chartered borough. Much of what
is found in the town and county custumals is a record of genuinely
ancient praxis. 41 There is evidence, however, that custumals were
amended from time to time as new rights emerged and others were
rendered obsolete.4 2 Newly chartered boroughs would often adopt
43
wholesale the customs of another town.
Manorial custom could be recorded in the customary of the
manor, but most surviving customaries appear to have been recorded
in modern times in preparation for litigation. 44 Manorial and other
rural custom in the medieval period need not be recorded because
the common law had few opportunities to pass judgement on rural
38

THEODORE F.T. PLUCKETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 312 (5th ed.

1956).
39 Another use of "the term 'custom' is to denote rules that once formed an exceptional body of law, but have been adopted within historical times as part of the Common
Law." POLLOCK, supra note 15, at 280.
40

J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 31 (3d ed. 1990).

41 In the medieval custumals, custom is described as "usage," "our use," and the "custom among us." NORMAN DOE, FUNDAMENTAL AuToRrR
IN MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAw 20

(1990).
42 For example, the custumal of Kent refers to rules of descent established by statute
after the time of the first recordation of Kent's customs. 3 WILLAM HOLDsWoRTH, A HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 263 (3d ed. 1926).
43 ALLEN, supra note 3, at 65-68.
44 BENALAH W. AnKuN, CoPyHoLD AND OTHER LAND TENURES OF ENGLAND 88 (2d ed.

1911).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:183

customs. 45 The custom of the manor governed the interest of the
copyholders and the landless peasants who lived on the lord's waste.
The tenure of copyhold, however, was not legally cognizable at common law until the middle of the sixteenth century. As a result, copy46
hold custom was not litigated at common law.
Most rural custom had its origins in the praxis of the community
rather than from the command of the manorial lord. In addition to
the absence of litigation, because there was sufficient land for lord
and commoners alike and the products of the common had no market value, 47 there was little need to define rights such as turbary (the
taking of turves and peats for fuel) and estover (the collection of small
wood for fencing, repairs and fuel).48
2.

The Early Modern Period: The Expansion of Common Law
Jurisdiction and the FirstEnclosure Movement

Rural communities in early modern England were made up of
the feudal lord, freeholders, copyholders, and inhabitants who lived

on the lord's waste and subsisted on the products of the common.
Like the copyholders, the inhabitants' access to the common was gov-

erned by the custom of the manor.
In the sixteenth century, rural England underwent the first enclosure movement. The great landowners sought to abandon traditional
agriculture in favor of sheep farming and production of cloth for the
international market. In order to graze animals, the landowners
49
sought to appropriate land formerly available for communal use.
Concurrent with this movement, the power and jurisdiction of
the common law expanded to recognize many of the disputes that had
45
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 42, at 400 ("The common law has fewer opportunities of
expressing its opinion upon the reasonableness of rural by-laws and customs. It can and

does so on occasion; but it is clearly the borough customs and by-laws which will afford the
most scope for interference of this kind.").
46

CHARLEs

MONTGOMERY GRAY, COPYHOLD,

EQurry,

AND THE COMMON LAW 54

(1963)

("It is almost certain that in the late fifteenth century copyholders had no remedy against
their lords at common law."). Common law courts began to recognize the claims of copyholders "shortly after the middle of the sixteenth century." Id. at 59.
47
See THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 133.
48
See THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 104.
49
R.H. TAWNEY, THE AGRARrAN PROBLEM IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 6-7 (1912). Land
could also be appropriated for tillage. 4 HOLDsWORTH, supra note 42, at 368. The two
great movements of enclosure occurred in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. TAwN-Y, supra, at 11-12. Although it is difficult to precisely date enclosure because it varied by
region
[O] pen fields were almost without exception enclosed by 1850, and opposition rarely kept commons and wastes open for much longer, except in special circumstances which include large wastes upon which several villages
intercommoned, forest and fenland regions, and commons contiguous to
market towns or larger urban centers.
THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 121.
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previously been the exclusive provenance of localities. With this expansion, judges assimilated local custom into the common law byjudicial notice 50 and established rules by which custom would be
recognized as operative law.5 1
Plucknett suggests that the delineation of the four elements of
custom-antiquity, continuity, certainty and reasonableness-by the
common law served as a check on the growth of customary tenures
and usages.5 2 For example, the element of antiquity required that all
custom recognized at common law must have originated before
1189. 5 3 Copyhold land did not even exist in 1189, but the require-

ment of antiquity ensured that, while some legitimately ancient usages
of the people would be judicially noticed by the common law, manorial courts could no longer promulgate new customs.
The newly declared element of certainty had a dramatic impact
on customary use-rights when it was applied by the Court of King's
Bench in Gateward's Case54 (1608) to rights of common. The court
declared that rights of common could not be claimed in the name of
a group as amorphous and "uncertain" as the "inhabitants" of a district. Only copyholders could claim a right of common by custom.55
Prior to the establishment and application of the four-part test in the
early seventeenth century, reasonable custom was recognized and applied by the common law courts.5 6 The development of a newjudicial
test limited the extent to which local custom was judicially noticed as
operative law. The test also regularized customary use-rights by attaching those rights to recognized tenurial interests in land.
Aside from the doctrinal significance of Gateward's Case, it is also
an important indicator of the effect of social forces on the development of customary law. The court would not recognize a right of
common vested in all inhabitants because a common that could be
claimed by virtue of inhabitancy would be "transitory and altogether
to uncertain, for it will follow the person, and for no certain time or
estate but during his inhabitancy, and such manner of interest the law
will not suffer, for custom ought to extend to that which hath certainty and continuance." 5 7 Although the court expressed its refusal to
recognize the inhabitants' right of common in terms of certainty, its
chief policy concern was that landowners be able to enclose. The

53
54
55

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
PLUcKNErr, supra note 38, at 312.
PLuCKNErr, supra note 38, at 312.
PLUcKNE, supra note 38, at 312.
6 Co. Rep. 59b, 77 Eng. Rep. 344 (KB. 1607).
Id. at 60b, 87 Eng. Rep. at 345-46.

56

WILIAM Noy,THE GROUNDS AND MAXIMS, AND ALSO AN ANALYSIS OF THE ENGUSH

50
51
52

LAWs 1 (Charles Barton ed., 7th ed., 1808) (originally published in 1641).
57 Gateward's Case, 6 Co. Rep. at 60a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 344-45.
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court noted that "every common may be suspended or extinguished,"5 8 but if the right of common were vested in inhabitants,
rather than copyholders of the manor, "no person certain can extinguish [the common], but as soon as he who... releases, &c. removes,
the new inhabitant shall have it."59
Following the decision in Gateward's Case,60 many rural customs
were said to have originated with a grant by a feudal lord, but historians agree that the "notion of the origin of common rights in royal or
feudal grants is a fiction." 6 1 Nonetheless, it was a fiction of great legal
significance. As we shall see below, Thompson argues that it was the
reappearance of the holding of Gateward's Case in the litigation surrounding inhabitant custom in the eighteenth century that resulted in
the destruction of custom and the loss of long-standing use-rights of
the landless cottager. But before turning to that period, it will be useful to examine more carefully the traditional elements of custom developed by the common law.
3.

The Crystallization of the Elements of Custom

By the seventeenth century, the four common law elements of
custom, which survive in name to this day, were in place. As this Note
later argues, the further evolution of custom law was spurred by the
partial reinterpretation of these elements in the eighteenth and then
again in the nineteenth century. The following is a detailed look at
the traditional elements of custom as they existed prior to the changes
in the modern period.
When custom was litigated in the King's courts, the existence of a
particular custom was a question of fact to be decided by the jury.6 2
Once proved in fact, local custom must have been found by the royal
judge to be good at law.63 Custom must "be not agaynste the lawe of
reason/nor the law of god/though they be agaynst the sayde generall
customis or maxymis of the law."64 A custom must be reasonable, and
58

Id. at 59b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 344.

59
60

Id., 77 Eng. Rep. at 345.

61
62

Id.
THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 132.
CHrIsToPHER ST. GERMAN, DocTOR AND STUDENT 71

64

ST. GERMAN, supra note 62, at 71.

(Selden Society ed. 1974)
(1528) ("yf it ryse in questyon between parties in the kynges courtes whether there be any
such partyculer custome or not/ it shalbe tryed by .xii. men whether there is such a custom or
not/ & not by the Iugis"); see also Bastard v. Smith, 2 M. & Rob. 129, 174 Eng. Rep. 238, 240
(Q.B. 1837) (example ofjury instructions).
63 Tyson v. Smith, 112 Eng. Rep. 1265, 1271 (Ex. Ch. 1838) (custom for all victuallers
to erect stall at fair on the lord's waste). "[O]f these several requisites to the validity of
custom, the only one which is brought in question on the present occasion is, whether the
custom is reasonable or not; and this is a question which it belongs to the Judges of the
land to determine." Id. at 1271.
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reason was the purview of the King's judges. 65 The existence of an
ancient custom was most often proved by the testimony of elderly
members of the community. 66 Once a custom was proved in fact, the
common law judge applied the tests of antiquity, continuity, certainty
and reasonableness. 67 These tests were applied as a matter of law to
determine "whether there was any evidence on which the jury [could]
find the custom proved" and to disallow custom that was contrary to
subsequent positive law or was too "unreasonable" to be judicially no68
ticed by the royal court.
Antiquity. The first ground upon which custom was deemed local
common law was its antiquity. The custom must have existed since a
S.C. CARTER, LEX CUSTUMARIk: OR, A TREATrsE OF COPy-HOLD ESTATES (1696).
Hammerton v. Honey, 24 W.R. 603, 604 (Ch. 1876) (proof of ancient custom is
often in the form of testimony of persons of middle to old age who attest that "in their
time, usually at least half a century, the usage has always prevailed").
67 For the four traditional elements of custom, see CARTER, supranote 65. Blackstone,
in his Commentarieslists the grounds of good custom as antiquity, continuity, peaceable use,
certainty, reasonableness, compulsory (not by license) and consistency. 1 Wni~m BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTAIES *76-78. The latter two requirements are logical rules that ensure
custom is local common law, rather than actual elements of custom.
Blackstone adds the element of "peaceable enjoyment" to the four-part judicial test of
custom. Id. at 77. According to Blackstone, "custom must have been peaceable and acquiesced in; not subject to contention and dispute. For as customs owe their original (sic) to
common consent, their being immemorially disputed either at law or otherwise is a proof
that such consent was wanting." Id.
Littleton says that possession by custom must be long, continual and peaceable.
THOMAS COVENTRY, A READABLE EDITION OF COKE UPON LITLETON § ll0a (1830). However, throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the commoners
right to assert their rights of the common by throwing down enclosures was supported in
law. See, e.g., Mason v. Caesar, 2 Mod. 65, 86 Eng. Rep. 944 (KlB. 1528); Hall v. Harding, 4
Burr. 2426, 98 Eng. Rep. 271 (KB. 1769); Arlett v. Ellis, 7 B. & C. 346, 108 Eng. Rep. 752
(lKB. 1827). In Arlet the commoners were sued for breaking down "hedges and fences"
and pulling down the bank "ina greater degree and to a greater extent, and with more
force and violence than was necessary for abating.., said supposed stoppages...." Id. at
348, 108 Eng. Rep. at 754. The court held that:
[W] here a fence has been erected upon a common, enclosing and separating parts of that common from the residue, and thereby interfering with
the rights of the commoners, the latter are not by law restrained, in the
exercise of those rights, to pulling down so much of that fence as it may be
necessary for them to remove for the purpose of enabling their cattle to
enter and feed upon the residue of the common, but that they are entitled
to consider the whole of that fence so erected upon the common as a nuisance, and to remove it accordingly.
Id. at 362, 108 Eng. Rep. at 758-59 (citation omitted).
While it may be true that a custom "immemorially disputed" will be disallowed by the
court, such cases are absent from the case law. The case law clearly asserts that commoners
need not acquiesce to the lord's usurpation of their customary right. The element of
peaceable enjoyment is notably absent from Pollock's work, despite the fact that he is careful to mention the other elements of custom described by Blackstone. Pollock recategorizes the elements or disagrees that they are an element at all. See PoLLOCK, supra note
15, at 280-83. For a colorful description of such assertions of right by commoners, see
THOMPsON, supra note 2, at 116-20.
68 ALLEN, supra note 3, at 89.
65
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"time whereof memory of man runneth not to the contrary."6 9 The
date of legal memory was fixed at 1189, by analogy to the time period
70
for bringing writs of right established by the Statute of Westminster.
The antiquity of custom was a legal presumption at common law, but
could be rebutted by evidence that a custom could not have existed
during the reign of Richard I. The element of antiquity was a legal
fiction that served as a check on the growing power of custom at com71
mon law, once the courts recognized copyhold as a legal interest.
Continuity. The right or license arising out of local custom must
have been exercised without interruption. 72 The element of continuity was evidence of custom as fact.1

3

Any significant interruption

in the exercise of a right that arose by custom created a presumption
that the custom never existed.7 4 Custom was law by virtue of ancient
usage, and any significant interruption of that usage indicated that it
was not truly a custom at all.75 Custom was rarely challenged on the
ground that it had not been continuous.
Certainty. The common law required that local custom be certain.
It had to lie in a definite district and be limited in scope to ensure that
local exceptions did not swallow the common law rule.7 6 The doc-

trine of custom recognized local exceptions to the common law. Custom could not inure to all the subjects of the realm because then it
77
would not have been local custom, but rather the common law itself.

It must have adhered to a definite locale because custom was local law
that bound the land and applied to those who owned or inhabited it
78
for as long as they resided there.
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 89.
70 ALLEN, supra note 3, at 89; Cf PoLocK, supra note 15, at 278 (that date was set by
accident or inertia).
71 PLUCKNETr, supra note 38, at 312.
72 ALLEN, supra note 3, at 91.
73 ALLEN, supra note 3, at 91.
74 Hammerton v. Honey, 24 W.R. 603 (Ch. 1876).
75 ALLEN, supra note 3, at 91.
69

76 See, e.g., Arthur v. Bokenham, 11 Mod. 148, 160, 88 Eng. Rep. 957, 962 (ILB.1708)
("[A]l1 customs which are against the common law of England, ought to be taken strictly,
nay very strictly, even stricter than any Act of Parliament that alters the common law.").
77 Earl of Coventry v. Willes, 12 W.R. 127, 128 (Q.B. 1863) (custom alleged for all the
Queen's subjects to enter the close to watch horse races is bad because "the rights possessed by the Queen's subjects generally are part of the general law of the land, not the
customs of a particular place").
78
CovENTRY, supra note 67, § 113b ("a custom, which is local, is alleged in no person,
but layd within some manor or other place"); Edwards v.Jenkins, [1896] 1 Ch. 308, 312-13
(defendant claimed that inhabitants of three adjoining parishes cannot maintain the right
to recreate on plaintiff's close because such a right could not have originated in a single
grant.); Sowerby v. Coleman, 2 L.R.-Ex. 95, 100 (1867) (Channell, B.) (custom of inhabitants of training horses outside their parish on a neighboring manor is bad because the
manor and parish were not co-extensive and the custom was not "properly laid in the
commencement"). For a discussion of the fictional origin of custom in the feudal grant
see infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
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Reasonableness. The most significant requirement of custom at
common law was that custom be reasonable, or as Blackstone more
accurately stated the rule, a custom must not have been unreasonable. 7 9 The element of reasonableness allowed the King's courts to determine which of the innumerable local customs would survive the
imposition of a uniform common law.
A custom might have existed in fact, but if it "conflict[ed] with any
fundamental principle of the Common Law," it could not be permitted to stand at law.80 A custom was never unreasonable merely because it was contrary to the common law. Local custom was by
definition a variation of the common law. Custom that conflicted with
a fundamental principle of the common law, however, could be de8
clared unreasonable. '
The test of reasonableness was applied to the contemporary practice of a custom rather than its origins. The courts acknowledged that
the origins of most customs had been lost to history.82 The common
law could not ascribe lawful origins to custom because it was by definition contrary to the common law. Courts would take judicial notice of
reasonable local custom because of its antiquity, but would refuse to
extend custom in the manner of the common law or an act of Parliament because custom lacked lawful origin.
II
THOMPSON

AND THE LAW OF CUSTOM IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY

E.P. Thompson has studied the jurisprudence of custom in the
eighteenth century and its impact on the landless cottager. He argues
that the reemergence of the holding in Gateward's Case, that the rights
of common could only inure to copyholders, reified use rights and
imposed capitalist definitions of property on traditional agrarian communities.8 3 In the eighteenth century, he argues, the common law
was an instrument of innovation that did away with customary userights of property by finding them unreasonable at law. The jurisprudence of custom became an instrument of class expropriation as
judges, who had common origins in the class of landowners, overruled
79

BLAcsroNE, supra note 67, at *77.

"Itis one thing for a custom to be a local variation of the general law, another for it
to negate the very spirit of law. It is ... sometimes a nice problem to decide which of these
two effects a custom produces." A.LE, supranote 3, at 88.
80

ALLEN, supra note 3, at 88.
82 See, e.g., Hix v. Gardiner, 2 Bulst. 195, 196, 80 Eng. Rep. 1062, 1063 (K.B. 1614)
("you cannot imagine the reason of a custom, the custom of borough English and
gavelkinde, are no reasonable customs, the reason to be shewed of the beginning of them
is impossible").
83 THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 134-35.

81
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custom by "allow[ing] 'reasons' to be considered which had more to
do with political economy... [than] strict attention to the terms of
84

law."

Thompson limited his study to the plight of the poorest members
of agricultural communities and made a significant contribution to
the understanding of the relationship between law and the social history of English agrarian society. The trend of abolishing customary
profits d prendre of the landless continued unabated into the nineteenth century. Indeed, as the market developed and different types
of material acquired value, a wide range of customs were litigated and
85
declared profits, which could not be claimed by inhabitants.
The study of custom at common law cannot be limited to its distributive effects-which class won or lost. The primary beneficiaries
of custom were the copyholders, a group which has yet to be adequately defined in terms of class by historians and who may in fact
86
defy such analysis.
Mick Reed draws attention to the historiographically "neglected
class" of small farmers in England in the nineteenth century, many of
whom may have been copyholders.8 7 Reed argues that this group,
who relied on common land, did not disappear with enclosure,8 8 but
supra note 2, at 137.
See, e.g., Blewett v. Tregonning, 111 Eng. Rep. 524 (KB. 1863) (practice of inhabitants to take drifted sand from seaside close for manuring their lands is a profit in alieno solo
and cannot be claimed by custom); Constable v. Nicholson, 14 C.B. (N.S.) 230, 143 Eng.
Rep. 434 (C.P. 1863) (custom to go onto the sea-shore between the high and low-water
mark and take gravel, stones and sand for cultivation of land and repair of highways is void
as a profit d prendrein alieno solo); Chilton v. Corporation of London, 7 Ch. D. 735 (1878)
(plaintiff's claim of right of inhabitants "to cut or lop, under the name of 'lopwood,' the
boughs and branches of the trees growing upon the waste lands of the... manor" cannot
be supported in law even though the defendant corporation did not deny the right);
Goodman v. Saltash Corp., 7 App. Cas. 633 (1882) (right of free inhabitants to take oysters
cannot be claimed by custom, but may be sustained as right arising by prescription); Lloyd
v.Jones, 6 C.B. 81, 136 Eng. Rep. 1182 (C.P. 1848) (custom does not sustain claim of right
to take trout from stream).
86 The legal historian may speak of the copyholders as constituting, in spite of
minor differences, a fairly well-defined class. The economic historian cannot. He finds, on the contrary, the widest difference between the economic
conditions of tenants holding their land by copy of court roll, not only, as
would be expected, in different parts of the country, but on the same
manor.
TAWNEY, supra note 49, at 55; THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 114 (citing Mick Reed, The Peasantiy of Nineteenth-Centur England. A Neglected Class, Hisr. WORKSHOP J. 53 (1984) ("one
must note that we still have little firm evidence as to the number of landowners who held
by copyhold or other forms of customary tenure... in the eighteenth century").
87
See Reed, supra note 86, at 53-54.
88 See Reed, supra note 86, at 57.
So strong was the obsession of nineteenth-century commentators with improved farming and large scale agriculture, that when they found different
systems, usually where they lived, they were sure that they were seeing something unusual, and historians have tended to take their observations at face
value. In fact they were wrong. Small farming and farmer-labourers sur84
85

THOMPSON,
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continued to play "a significant economic and social role within the
English countryside."8 9 It was the copyholders who could legally resist
enclosure by self-help 90 and challenge the local gentry who sought to
rid the country of customary use-rights. 9 1 In the nineteenth century,
copyhold custom was universally upheld by the courts, aided by Parlia92
ment's passage of the Prescription Act.
In the area of easement custom, the focus of Thompson's study,
customs of inhabitants were also vested by the Prescription Act 93 and
customary rights to markets, recreation and renewable resources were
recognized by common law courts.9 4 In the nineteenth century, the
common law upheld the custom of inhabitants on the ground that it
served the greater good of the community.9 5 Arguing that the common law abolished local custom of inhabitants in the eighteenth century, Thompson contends that the terms " 'reasonable' and
'unreasonable' . . . were gates through which a large flock of other
considerations might come baaing and grunting onto the field of the
common law." 9 6 During the nineteenth century, the terms of reasonableness were indeed transformed, but considerations of utility led
97
courts to preserve long-established use rights.
The differences between the conclusions of Thompson and the
findings of this Note reflect the rejection of notions of arbitrary lordship by the courts after the era of enclosure and a shift in the judicial
philosophy of political economy with the rise of utilitarian thought
after 1830.
The eighteenth century witnessed the second great movement of
enclosure; during which landowners sought to appropriate communal
land.9 8 Courts responded to enclosure by upholding the arbitrary
vived in many places. Often they relied on common land, as well as their
own holdings.
Id. at 60.
89
Reed, supra note 86, at 60.
90 See supra note 67.
91 Reed, supra note 86, at 67.
92 Prescription Act, 2 & 3 Will. 4 ch. 71 (1832). See infra notes 141-51 and 162-73 and
accompanying text.
93 See infra notes 143, 152-57 and accompanying text.
94 See infra notes 134-37, 152-57, and 226-37 and accompanying text.
95 See infra notes 13440.
96

THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 130.

See infra notes 13440, 155-57 and 229-31 and accompanying text.
The two great movements of enclosure occurred in the sixteenth and eighteenth
centuries. TAwNEY, supra note 49, at 11-12, 183. It is difficult to date enclosure precisely
because it varied by region,
[O]pen fields were almost without exception enclosed by 1850, and opposition rarely kept commons and wastes open for much longer, except in special circumstances which include large wastes upon which several villages
intercommoned, forest and fenland regions, and commons contiguous to
market towns or larger urban centres.
97
98
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power of lordship. If the lord could prove his superior right by custom or immemorial use, then his use could derogate not only the userights of landless cottagers, but also the rights of his copyholders. 9 9
In the nineteenth century, courts rejected the arbitrary power of
lordship and refused to recognize customs that vested rights solely in
the lord of the manor. 10 0 Not only did the common law protect the
interests of the copyholder, but it also rebuked lords who sought to
take advantage of the purported power of lordship. In Betts v. Thompson,10 1 for example, the Master of the Rolls upheld the plaintiffs'
rights of common and issued a decree forbidding the lord to put up
fences. On appeal, the Lord Chancellor upheld the order, adding
that:
[T] he lord had purchased the manor for a comparatively small sum,
and if he had succeeded in depriving the freeholders of all rights
would have made a very handsome profit; and he seemed to have
considered that, being the lord, his title would not without difficulty
10 2
be displaced. In that speculation he had been disappointed.
In the area of inhabitant custom, courts employed a utilitarian
calculus to uphold custom that evidenced the consent of the community and served the greater good. 0 3 Private land was reserved for
community recreation 10 4 and rights to renewable resources were pre10 5
served by the common law even after enclosure.
In some cases courts would employ a legal fiction to uphold customs that benefitted the community. The Court in Willingale v.
Maitland,10 6 ruling on a demurrer for want of equity, presumed a royal
grant in order to uphold an inhabitant custom that would otherwise
have been void as profit d prendre inuring to an uncertain class.' 0 7 The
court reasoned that the parish and forest were royal lands and that the
Crown had a unique power to grant to "the poor, or labouring, inhabitants of the parish" the right to cut wood from the forest for their
own use and for sale for their own benefit. 0 8 In Chilton v. Corporation
of London, Master of the Rolls Jessel narrowed the Willingale holding by
THOMPSON, supranote

2, at 121.

99 Bateson v. Green, 5 T.R. 411, 101 Eng. Rep. 230 (KB. 1793) (where it can be
proved that copyholder's right to the common has been subservient to the lord's right to
dig clay, the lord or those empowered by him can dig without leaving sufficient herbage
for the copyholders).
100
See infra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
101
6 L.R.-Ch. App. 732 (1871).
102
Id. at 741 (Lord Hatherley, L.G.).
103
See infra notes 134-40, 155-57 and 229-31 and accompanying text.
104
See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
105
See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
106 3 L.R.-Eq. 102 (1866).
107 Id. at 108.
108 Id.
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distinguishing the case as an instance where the judge ruling on demurrer was bound to take allegations of a grant as true even though
09
"he and everybody else in [c]ourt knew that they were fictitious."
Nevertheless, the decision in Willingale was a far cry from that in Steel
v. Houghton,"10 where the right of gleaning by the labourers of the
parish was struck down on grounds that it "would raise the insolence
of the poor.""'

Thompson alternately condemns the common law courts as the
tools of agrarian capitalism and acknowledges that thejudiciary's condemnation of custom was not aimed at the landless poor, but rather
interlopers and entrepreneurs." 1 2 In the nineteenth century, the market economy placed new pressures on communally held resources,
and rights to those resources had to be defined with a new certainty.
In Wilson v. Willes,"13 for example, the defendant was sued for break-

ing and entering the plaintiff's land and taking 100 square yards of
turf, worth twenty pounds." 4 The defendant alleged that "customary
tenants immemorially dug, taken and carried away.., such turf as had
been fit and proper [for making and repairing gardens and making
and repairing mounds for hedges and fences] at all times in the year,
5
as often, and in such quantity as occasion had required."" The custom was held void for uncertainty because a custom limited only by
"caprice and fancy" was "inconsistent with the rights of all the other
commoners, as well as of the lord." 1 6
When the custom in Willes is examined in historical context, it is
likely that the custom existed as alleged, but at a time when the commoners were taking turf for their individual use. The defendant in
this case removed one hundred square yards of turf, an amount
clearly intended for market. Thus, a once valid custom became "uncertain" or legally unreasonable because of its exploitation by an entrepreneur. In Wilson v. Willes, the law intervened to prevent the

110

7 Ch. D. 735, 742 (1878) (Jessel, M.R).
126 Eng. Rep. 32 (C.P. 1788).

111
112
113

Id. at 38 (Heath, J.).
THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 133.
103 Eng. Rep. 46 (KB. 1806).

114

Id. at 4647.

109

115

at 47.
id.

116 Id. at 49. For another example of a custom held bad at law on grounds that its
uncertainty would lead to the destruction of the property, see Sowerby v. Coleman, 2 L.R.Ex. 95, 99-100 (1867) (Kelly, C.B.) (custom for the inhabitants of a parish to train horses
outside the limits of the parish is bad because "[s]uch a right, then, to exercise an indefinite
number of horses, for an indefinite period of the year, would exclude the owner from the
beneficial occupation of his property during probably the whole year, and cannot be sustained on behalf of a parish or district beyond the limits of the place where it is to be
exercised").

200
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"Tragedy of the Commons."1 17 Under the pressure of entrepreneurial
activity, the community's traditional methods of resource management failed." 8 The common law, far from acting as an instrument of
class expropriation, protected the commons and the rightful exercise
of the commoners' customary rights." 9
Thompson is doubtless correct that the restriction of the use of
the commons to those who had an interest in the manorial land disappropriated those landless cottagers who lived on the lord's waste and
subsisted on the products of the common. The decisions of eighteenth century courts had a profound effect on agrarian communities
throughout England, forcing those without land and rights of common into exploitive wage labor for the great landowners. 120 Courts of
the eighteenth century also upheld customs vesting arbitrary power in
the lord without regard to the copyholders and the landless poor.
Nineteenth century courts, however, preserved easement customs
of recreation, markets and water rights, and upheld copyholders'
rights of common. The common law took no cognizance of those
disappropriated in the eighteenth century and inhabitants continued
to lose customary use rights in the nature of profits d prendre. Common
law courts did, however, regularly uphold custom. A class of customary use-rights were extinguished by the common law, but custom as a
category of law remains vital. Thompson has identified a paradox of
the eighteenth century: plebeian culture was rebellious, but rebellious in defense of custom.' 2 ' The paradox of the nineteenth century

was that a distinctly modem, positivist judiciary upheld custom on
grounds of its utility.

117 Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1343-48 (1968). Hardin
argues that when communal resources are owned and protected by no one, they will inevitably be over-exploited because no one member of the community has an interest in preserving the whole of the resource.
118
THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 107 ("[o]ver time and over space the users of commons
have developed a rich variety of institutions and community sanctions which have effected
restraints and stints upon use").
119
But cf.THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 138 ("[a]uthorities on enclosure fail to examine
...
whether.., the law itself may not have been the instrument of class expropriation").
120 One must be careful, however, not to exaggerate the impact of common law judgments on customary activities. Peter King has demonstrated that the common law judgment against gleaning failed to halt the practice. See generally Peter King, Gleaners, Farmers
and the Failureof Legal Sanction in England 1750-1850, 125 PAST & PRESENTr 116 (1989). Even
more importantly for purposes of this study, in areas where gleaning was a custom recorded in by-laws or in the elderly's memories, a particular local judgment had to be obtained before the practice could be abrogated by law. Id. at 139. See David Sugarman,

Towards a New History of Law and Material Society in England 1750-1914, in LAW, ECONOMY
AND Socirv 32-33 (G.R. Rubin & David Sugarman eds., 1984).
121 THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 9.
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III
EvENTs AFFECTING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CUSTOM IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY

A.

Positivism and the Law of Custom

The traditional positivist conception of law is that law is a system
of rules laid down by the lawgivers: the King, Parliament and their
courts. 122 The jurisprudence of custom illuminates a central paradox

of the common law. Although the royal courts are rapidly imposed
upon the realm a uniform common law, 123 a litigant could always
plead custom, a right or defense issuing from the community that the
24
common law recognized as an exception to itself.'
Jeremy Bentham, the father of legal positivism, 125 addresses the
paradox of custom in his Commentaies. Bentham distinguishes between two types of custom: custom that arises by praxis ("originally
spontaneous custom") and custom that has been granted the imprimatur of the royal courts ("legalized custom"). According to Bentham, spontaneous custom gives rise to legitimate expectations, but
122 A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY 359, 362 (1987) (The "weak"
form of positivism describes a system of rules that pass a test of validity established by an
ultimate rule of recognition. As A.W.B. Simpson points out, this weak form of positivism,
which moves away from the position that all law is enacted, does not wholly account for the
source of the validity test. Id. at 365. Customary practice is only mentioned briefly by
H.L.A. Hart as a possible source of law. Id. at 366 (citing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAw 97 (1961)).
123 Salt, supra note 1, at 282:
[We may safely say that the term common law means paramount custom of
the Curia Regis every bit as much as popular usage of the people. It is
"common" because the royal judges have foisted it on the realm at large in
defeasance of the more ancient shire customs and at the expense of the
feudal jurisdictions.
See also DOE, supranote 41, at 26 ("[a]s compared with parliamentary legislation and local
customary law, whose authority is derived predominantly from the consent of the community at large, .. . judicial consent alone shapes the common law").
124 ALLEN, supra note 3, at 86.
125 Philip Schofield has argued thatJohn Austin, rather than Bentham, was the major
influence on nineteenth century academicjurisprudence. Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham
and Nineteenth-Century EnglishJurispidence,12 J. OF LEGAL HIST. 58, 61 (1991). I have discussed positivism in terms of Bentham because of the influence of his theory of utility. Id.
at 59. Austin agreed that, once it had been "legalized," custom became law by command
and not consent:
The admirers of customary law love to trick out their idol with mysterious
and imposing attributes. But to those who can see the difference between
positive law and morality, there is nothing of mystery about it. Considered
as rules of positive morality, customary laws arise from the consent of the
governed, and not from the position or establishment of political superiors.
But, considered as moral rules turned into positive laws, customary laws are
established by the state: established by the state directly, when the customs
are promulged [sic] in its statutes; established by the state circuitously, when
the customs are adopted by its tribunals.
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OFJURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF
JURISPRUDENCE 32 (Noonday Press 1954) (1832, 1863).
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cannot create a binding legal obligation until it is legalized by a common law court. Moreover, custom cannot be said to have been made
with the consent of the people because custom is produced by the
12 6
common law.
Bentham's explanation of custom does not comport with the
common law doctrine, whereby the court takes judicial notice of custom as lex loci or local common law. In the daily life of the community
custom may have been more "ambience, rnntaliti... a whole vocabulary of discourse, legitimation and expectation" than strictly defined
rules. 127 However, when a dispute over custom reached the royal
court, community praxis was recognized as local common law that
gave rise to legally enforceable rights and obligations. While some of
what was termed custom may have been, as Bentham points out, positive law of "local judicatories which the Common Law courts ... re-

fused to recognize," 128 on the whole, custom was law by virtue of
community praxis. Customary rights and obligations were legally
vested by virtue of immemorial usage.
In the nineteenth century, common law courts employed both
natural law and positivist, utilitarian theory to declare custom lex loci.
In a departure from a line of precedent originating in the seventeenth
century, 129 courts required that good custom have legitimate and reasonable origins in the feudal manor. Thus, all custom must have been
established by the authority of the lord. Customs that could not have
been established in a single manorial jurisdiction were held bad for
uncertainty. 3 0 Custom, like positive law, must derive from and apply
to a legally defined jurisdiction.
Custom could be established, however, solely by command. Nineteenth century courts held that custom could only be reasonable if it
was created with the consent of the community. Copyhold custom
had to evidence the consent of the homage,' 3 ' and easement customs
had to have been the result of "repeated acts of assent" by both the
property owner and the beneficiary of the customary usage. 132 While
custom must have been promulgated within the jurisdiction of a recognized authority, its legitimacy, contrary to the positivist theory of
sovereignty, rested on the consent of the people.
126 JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES: A CRITICISM OF WILLIAM
BLAcISoNE's COMMENTAIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 221-23 (1928). See GERALDJ. PosTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 268-69 (1986).
127 THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 2.
128 BENTHAM, supra note 126, at 234-35.
129 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
130 See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
131
132

See infra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
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Bentham's theory of sovereignty rejected centuries of jurispru-

33
dence that established the special status of local custom as lex /oCi.1

The increasing positivism of common law courts in the nineteenth
century is revealed in their insistence on proof of custom's reasonable
origins. Nevertheless, common law courts could not support the notion that custom is law imposed by the sovereign. Customs were considered to have grown up with the tacit consent of those who employ
them.
Bentham's most significant influence on the jurisprudence of
custom was not his theory of sovereignty, but rather, his theory of utility. In the nineteenth century, good custom reflected the consent of
the people and served the interests of the community at large. Courts
regularly upheld traditional and recently modified easement customs
on the ground that they provided the greatest good for the greatest
number. In Hall v. Nottingham,13 4 for example, the inhabitants of the
parish of Ashford Carbonell claimed a custom to "go upon the ...
land [known as the Maypole Piece] ...at all times, for the purpose of
using the same as a recreation ground... ."135 The Court of the Exchequer unanimously upheld the custom as reasonable despite Chief
Baron Kelly's doubts that such a custom that would deprive the owner
of the beneficial use and enjoyment of his freehold could be reasonable. 3 6 Nevertheless, Kelly upheld the custom because:
[w] e are dealing, it must be remembered with a matter affecting an
individual owner of a small piece of land on the one hand, and the
rights and privileges of all the inhabitants of an entire parish on the
other; and it is so much for the physical and moral benefit and advantage of those inhabitants that they should have rational and
healthful recreation, and that they should have a piece of ground
on which they may be able to indulge in the exercise of all lawful
sports, games, and pastimes, that I think the benefit and advantage
accruing to them from the right claimed outweigh the injury and
37
disadvantage arising therefrom to the owner of the land.'
In Hal the court upheld the claimed custom because the benefit
to the community outweighed the harm to the individual. Similarly,
in Mercer v. Denne,'3 8 an early twentieth century easement case that
involved the spreading of fishermen's nets on private land, the court
observed that a custom which derogated the rights of an individual to
the benefit of the community was reasonable. In Mercer, the court
went so far as to hold that the benefit to the community was proof that
133

134
135
136
137
138

Kiralfy, supra note 3,at 30.
33 L.T.R. 697 (Ex. D. 1876).
Id.

Id. at 699.
Id.
Mercer, [1904] 2 Ch. 534, 552 (FanvellJ.), afld, [1905] 2 Ch. 538 (CA).
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the custom had a "lawful commencement" and did not result from
accident or indulgence. 3 9 In so holding, the court sustained modern
innovations of the ancient custom that acted to deprive the owner of
the beneficial use of his land, because to do otherwise "might result in
making an arrangement that was in its inception reasonable, because
40
of public benefit, become actually injurious to public interests."
B.

The Prescription Act

In 1832, Parliament passed the Prescription Act,' 41 legislation introduced by the Chief Justice of the King's Bench to remedy the
"[i] nconvenience and [i] njustice" that resulted from the requirement
at common law that a right claimed by custom must have originated
before 1189. Copyhold custom was declared nonrebuttable upon a
showing of thirty years' use and was made "absolute and indefeasible"
after sixty years. 14 2 The Act vested easements after twenty years of use
and made the right absolute and indefeasible after forty years of
43
use.1
The Prescription Act was meant to formally institute the legal presumptions of the antiquity of custom, but its effect was broader in
scope. 144 In EarlDe La Wart v. Miles,145 the lord of the Manor of Duddleswell sued the copyholders for taking "brakes, fern, heather, and
litter" from the lord's forest.' 46 The manor had been enclosed and in
the decree the rights of "pasturage and herbage," (the right to turn
beasts out to feed) had been reserved to the commoners. 147 The
Court of Appeal agreed that the right of cutting litter had not been
included in the grant and refused to recognize the right as one arising
by immemorial prescription or lost grant.148 Nonetheless, the right
was upheld as custom because the commoners had taken litter "as of
right"149 for the sixty-year time period mandated in the Prescription
Act.' 5 0 So long as the right alleged was one that could arise by cus139

Id. at 552.

140
141

Id.
The Prescription Act 2 and 3 Will. IV. c. 71 (1832).

142

Id.

Id.
3 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates 442 (March 15, 1831).
145
17 Ch. D. 535 (C.A. 1881).
146
Id. at 540.
147
Id. at 540.
148
Id. at 590-91.
149
Id. at 591 ("The true interpretation of those words 'as of right' seems to me to be
that he has done so upon a claim to do it, as having a right to do it without the lord's
permission, and that he has so done it without that permission.").
143
144

150

Id. at 595.
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tom, the Prescription Act ensured that sixty years of community use
was sufficient to create a legally cognizable custom.1 51
In Race v. Ward, 152 a case arising under the Act, the inhabitants
claimed access to a well by custom and fifty years' use after enclosure.
The case began after the community members breaking a drain that
had been placed on the field to drain away water from the well:
the defendants broke into and burst the said drain, and threw and
placed large quantifies of earth &c. there, and wrongfully obstructed the same, whereby divers large quantifies of the waters
which from time to time during the time collected and were in and
upon the said field were prevented from running away from the
same as they otherwise would have done, and were then caused to
153
overflow and accumulate upon the said field.
Like the copyholders in Arlett v. Ellis, the inhabitants had taken back
by force their common right of water and defended their trespass on
15 4
grounds of immemorial custom.

The court accepted their plea and gave judgment for the defendants.155 The court, on a rule to enter the verdict for the plaintiff, upheld the community's right of access to the well. 156 The enclosure
decree had not specifically extinguished the well, and the court would
not deny the custom by implication of enclosure because it did "not
think that there is in all inclosures an intention to extinguish, for the
sake of agriculture, a right which is often of so great importance to the
157
inhabitants as that of drawing water for domestic purposes."
The Prescription Act was judicially proposed legislation that protected the holders of customary use-rights. 158 Courts employed the
Act to support the interests of inhabitants and copyholders against
large landowners. One judge wrote, with a tone of reproof, of the
considerable authority, dicta at all events by learned Judges sitting in
the Court of Chancery, that where the facts of user are proved, the
Court ought to be astute to discover some legal mode in which the
claim of right might be maintained, that is to say, that the Court
ought to lean heavily in favor of the defence of a prescription under
the statute. Now, if by that it is meant that the Court ought to look
at the evidence with extreme indulgence, I beg leave to say that I
15 9
cannot accede to that view.
151
152
153
154

Id. at 594.
4 El. & B1. 702, 119 Eng. Rep. 259 (Q.B. 1855).
Id.

155

See supra note 67.
Race, 119 Eng. Rep. at 264.

156

7 El. & BI. 384, 119 Eng. Rep. 1289 (Q.B. 1857).

157

Id. at 390, 119 Eng. Rep. at 1291 (Erle, J.).
158 The Prescription Act was proposed by the Chief Justice of the Court of King's
Bench, Lord Tenterden. 3 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates 442 (March 15, 1831).
159 Earl De La Warr v. Miles, 17 Ch. D. 535, 595 (CA. 1881) (Brett, LJ.).
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The judge did go on, however, to approve the custom of the copy160
holders upon proof of sixty years of use.
Parliament and common law judges placed their faith in copyholders as the best managers of communal land. The lord and his
tenants were left alone to regulate their resources in the lord's court.
After 1860 courts looked only to the origins of custom to determine its
reasonableness.

16 1

IV
RECONSTRUCTION OF CUSTOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

A.

Copyhold Custom in the Nineteenth Century

By the nineteenth century, courts were treating copyhold as a
contract between a lord and his customary tenants. Royal judges applied contract theory to determine whether a copyhold custom was
good at law and concluded that a lord and his copyholders were free
to arrange their relations as they saw fit so long as the custom evidenced the copyholders' consent.
In 1861 the House of Lords narrowed the inquiry into the reasonableness of copyhold custom by limiting judicial review to the origins
of the custom. 1 62 As the profits to be made from land grew with the

development of markets in the nineteenth century, litigation ensued
between lords and their copyholders over the right to develop the
copyhold for various industrial uses. For example, in Salisbury v. Gladstone,163 a lord brought an action for ejectment of a copyholder who
was digging up clay on his holding and selling it as bricks. The Salisbury Court refused to find the custom unreasonable because " 'reasonable [ness]' when applied to a custom regulating the relation between a
lord and his copyholders" was hard to define. 6 4 This was because a
lord and his copyholders could stipulate to whatever arrangement
they wished. If the parties continued to act on that arrangement, the
judge would not declare the arrangement void for unreasonableness. 165 Lord Cranworth added that the element of reasonableness
meant nothing more than that the custom "resulted from accident or
indulgence, and not from any right conferred in ancient times on the
66
party setting up the custom.'1

160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id.
See discussion infra notes 162-94.
Salisbury v. Gladstone, 9 H.L. Cas. 692, 11 Eng. Rep. 900 (1861).
Id.
Id. at 701, 11 Eng. Rep. at 903.

d.
Id. at 701-02, 11 Eng. Rep. at 903-04.
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The holding in Salisbuy led to great profits for the copyholders of
the manor of Leighton. In Hanmer v. Chance,167 the sand beneath the
tenements contained valuable silver vitreous sand, which was used in
the manufacture of glass. 168 Prior to that decision, the lord of the
manor had won an order enjoining the copyholders from digging up
their holdings and selling the sand to a glass manufacturer. 169 On
appeal, the Hanmer Court reversed the injunction on proof of the copyhold custom "to dig for and get sand, sandstone, gravel and clay from
their respective tenements... and to cart and carry away the same on
to other lands... and to use or sell the same either on or off the...
manor without license from the lord." 7 0 The court emphasized that,
although the custom of taking the valuable sand and selling it to the
glass company had only been proved to have existed for twenty-seven
years, this proof was merely part of the evidence that showed a general
custom of taking sand from the manor.1 71 It may be that, in finding
for the copyholders, the Lord Chancellor "allowed 'reasons' to be
considered which had more to do with political economy... [than]
strict attention to the terms of law."17 2 At the time that the injunction
was sought, a major glass manufacturer had already removed 50,000
173
tons of sand.
Manorial customs that courts found unreasonable at law were
those favoring the lord's interests over those of the copyholders. For
7 4 the lord's coal mining undermined
example, in Hilton v. Granville,1
the foundation of the tenant's house. The lord claimed a custom by
which he could enter any lands within the manor and take coal without compensating for any damage caused to the dwellings located
thereon. 17 The court held the custom repugnant and void and noted
that the unreasonableness of the custom was "too clear from the simple statement to admit of illustration of the argument."'176 The court
in Hilton relied on an earlier decision that had invalidated another
mining custom that "favoured ... arbitrary power, and might (as laid)
put in the power of the lord, totally to deprive the tenant of the bene77
fit of the land.'
Alleged customs that favored the lord's interests over those of his
tenants were struck down on the ground that the tenants would not
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Hanmer v. Chance, 4 De G.J. & S. 626, 46 Eng. Rep. 1061 (Ch. 1865).
Id. at 628, 46 Eng. Rep. at 1062.
Id. at 626, 46 Eng. Rep. at 1061-62.
Id. at 629, 46 Eng. Rep. at 1062.
Id. at 630-31, 46 Eng. Rep. at 1063.
THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 137.
Hanmer, 4 De G.J. & S. at 632, 46 Eng. Rep. at 1063.

174

5 Q.B. 701, 114 Eng. Rep. 1414 (1845).

175
176
177

Id.

Id. at 730, 114 Eng. Rep. at 1425.
Wilkes v. Broadbent, 2 Strange 1225, 93 Eng. Rep. 1146 (KB. 1745).
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consent to such customs. Lords and copyholders were free to contract
to custom as they wished, but courts upheld the custom as reasonable
only if the contract demonstrated the parties' consent. In Arlett v. Ellis,178 the landowner answered the copyholders' claim of common by

alleging a custom vested in the lord to enclose the whole of the common at his discretion. 179 The landholder sought to prove his right by
custom to do with the common what he will by showing that he had
made various grants of the common. However, the grants were apparently not made "with the consent of the homage, or... [in a manner
allowing] a sufficiency of common... [to] remain[] for the... [use of
the] commoners." i8 0 Upholding the right of the defendant commoners, the court stated that the right of the common could not be utterly
destroyed "by the act of the lord himself."' 8 ' The court distinguished
the case at bar from the facts of Folkardv. Hemmett,'8 2 where the lord
obtained the consent of the homage before making grants of the common. The consent of all tenants who could, by right, appear before
the lord's court assured the commoners (and the royal judges) that a
sufficient portion of the common would be retained for customary
use.183 In contrast, the Arlett court did not uphold the alleged custom
of the lord because the commoners did not, nor would they ever, consent to such a custom.

84

Consent to feudal custom is a legal fiction created by the courts
of the nineteenth century. Custom is law by virtue of immemorial usage and cannot rationally be said to have been consented to by anyone. Manorial customs arose at a time when a fee interest in land was
valuable, but wasteland for common use was plentiful.'8 5 In rare instances, courts may have documented manorial custom, 8 6 but even
87
where documentation does exist, its accuracy is in doubt.
178

179
180
181

7 B. & C. 346, 108 Eng. Rep. 752 (K.B. 1827).
Id. at 349, 108 Eng. Rep. at 754.
Id.
Id. at 369, 108 Eng. Rep. at 761.

182
5 T.R. 417, 101 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1776) (lord claims custom of licensing
noncopyholders to pasture beasts on the lord's waste).
183
Arlett 7 B. & C. at 368-69, 108 Eng. Rep. at 761 ("[T]he homage would never consent to any part of the common being taken away from the tenants, unless they were satisfied that sufficient remained for the commoners.").

184

Id.

THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 27.
186 See, e.g., Folkard,5 T.R. 417, 101 Eng. Rep. 234 (manorial records reveal consent of
the homage to grants of right of pasturage to strangers).
187
These documentary sources are often partisan briefs drawn up by the lord's
steward, or by the substantial landholders on the in-coming of a new lord;
or they may even be the result of bargaining and compromise between several propertied parties in the manorial court, in which the cottager or the
landless had no voice on the homage.
THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 101.
185
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Modem historians of feudalism do not recognize the fictional
feudal manor described in nineteenth century legal judgments. The
feudal order rested on power, not consent. Although the lord's alleged custom, at issue in Hilton v. Granville,'88 of destroying his tenants' homes without recompense, was unreasonable by any standard,
in many cases, such as Arlett v. Ellis,189 the lord most likely did sell off
portions of the common by right. Yet it was the Hilton and Arlett
courts that repudiated such power of lordship that had been upheld
in eighteenth century cases such as Bateson v. Green.190
Courts in the nineteenth century created an historical fiction in
defense of custom and community property rights. Utilitarian notions
of custom as law for the greater good that was founded in a contract
between lord and copyholder pervaded the jurisprudence of copyhold. Courts almost universally upheld customs alleged by the copyholders, even when the landowner was a powerful and influential
institution, such as Queen's College, Oxford. 19 1 In Warrick v. Queen's
College, Oxford,19 2 the college was sued by the freeholders of the manor
for enclosing the commons. Despite the fact that the manor in Warrick had no copyholders, the court permitted the individual freeholders to sue on behalf of all freeholders of the manor and upheld their
193
right of common.
The courts' deference to custom was the result of ajudicial policy
to protect long-established users of customary rights. 194 The rationale
for preserving custom at law -was that custom benefitted the community as a whole. Therefore, courts upheld agreements between a lord
and the copyholders only in so far as they benefitted the community
and evidenced the consent of the homage. The themes of consent,
the greater good, and legitimate origin in the feudal order echo
188
189

5 Q.B. 701, 114 Eng. Rep. 1414 (1845).
7 B. & C. 346, 108 Eng. Rep. 752 (K.B. 1827).
5 T.R. 411, 101 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B. 1793).
Warrick v. Queen's College, Oxford, 10 L.R.-Eq. 105 (1870), af'd, 6 Ch. App. 716

190
191
(1871).
192 10 L.R.-Eq. 105 (1870).
193 Id. at 126, 129, aftd, 6 Ch. App. at 726.
194 "[T]he Court is entitled; nay, bound by authority-not merely from an inclination
towards any abstract rule ofjustice-when it finds rights which have been exercised [continuously for over two hundred years] ... to find the origin of them in some way if it can."
6 Ch. App. at 722.
After all, whatever definition you may give to custom and prescription,
we all know that they are legal fictions invented by judges for the purpose
of giving a legal foundation or origin to long usage.... [W]hen you find
long-continued usage which can have a legal origin, then, with the view of
preserving to the people claiming them the quiet possession of the rights of
property or rights of easement which they have so long enjoyed, you shall
attribute these rights, if possible, to a legal origin so as to support them.
Hammerton v. Honey, 24 W.R. 603, 604 (Ch. 1876).
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throughout the case law in defense of all custom, including that which
did not attach to an interest in land.
B.

The Custom of Inhabitants

Customs in the nature of easements compose the second category
of rural custom and could be claimed by all inhabitants of a district.
Easement-type customs were not recorded or agreed upon in the
lord's court. Unlike the customs of copyhold, easement customs remained subject to the common law tests of antiquity, continuance,
certainty, and reasonableness throughout the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
Nineteenth century courts were influenced not only by economic
utilitarianism, but also by the positivist theory of the common law.
Traditionally, custom was a unique form of law that was believed to
have no reasonable origin. Custom arose from ancient community
praxis, the rationale for which was lost to history. Under positivist theory, however, all law must be handed down. Valid custom was that
which resembled positive law: rules derived from and applied to a certain jurisdiction that royal judges could apply rationally. Nineteenth
century judges updated the ancient doctrine of custom by redefining
the traditional elements of antiquity, certainty and reasonableness and
ascribing lawful beginnings to custom in a fictional, democratic feudal
order.
1. Antiquity
The first ground on which custom was deemed to be local common law was that it was the way things had been done since a "time
whereof memory of man runneth not to the contrary,"judicially established as 1189 A.D. 195 By the nineteenth century, of course, few litigants could prove that a custom had been in continuous existence for
over six centuries, but by then the ancient origin of custom was legal
presumption. 196 In the early twentieth century case of Mercerv. Denne,
for example, the testimony of fishermen that the custom of drying
fishing nets on the plaintiff's land existed for "the whole of their
195

ALLEN, supra note 3, at 89.

196

The legal presumption of antiquity was "rendered absolutely necessary by the previ-

ous 'judicial legislation,' which established the reign of Richard I as the extent of legal
memory." Bryant v. Foot, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 497, 516 (1868). In R v. Joliffe, where the evidence
showed the existence of custom for more than twenty years, the court instructed the jury
that "slight evidence [of custom], if uncontradicted, became cogent proof' of immemorial
usage. 2 B. & C. 54, 107 Eng. Rep. 303 (KB. 1823). On appeal, the court upheld the
charge because "[a] regular usage for 20 years, not explained or contradicted, is that upon
which many private and public rights are held .... " Id. at 59, 107 Eng. Rep. at 305. Thus,
regular usage for twenty years was the fictional period whereby courts presumed a grant by
prescription. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 90.
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memory... extending over more than seventy years" was strong evi97

dence of antiquity.1

Although the immemorial usage of custom enjoyed a presumption at law, the presumption was still rebuttable. In Simpson v. Wells,19 8
the court rejected the custom of setting up a stall at a fair to hire
servants because the authorization for such fairs was the Statute of
Labourers, instituted in 1349, two centuries after the date of legal
memory. The unreasonableness of an alleged custom could also serve
to defeat the claim of its antiquity. In Bryant v. Foot, for example, the
rector of a parish claimed the right to a 13 shilling marriage fee. The
court denied the custom because the law will not presume the impossible, "that such a sum as 13s. should have been payable as of right
upon every marriage in a small rural parish in England in the time of
Richard I.'1 9 9 In order to avoid the legal presumption of antiquity,
litigants sometimes challenged the antiquity of a custom under the
guise of the element of certainty. Not only was the presumption
avoided, but courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
demonstrated a willingness to strike down custom on grounds of
200
certainty.
In Mercer v. Denne, plaintiff fishermen sought a declaration that
the fishermen of the parish were entitled to dry their nets on the defendant's land.2 0 The custom claimed was that "inhabitants [of
Walmer] carrying on the trade or business of fishermen... had from
time immemorial . . .exercised the right and privilege at all times
20 2
necessary or proper.., to dry their nets upon the beach ground."
The defendant challenged the custom on grounds of certainty.
He argued that the custom claimed must be "to dry nets at particular

times for particular fish."20 3 Although fishermen had dried herring

and mackerel nets on the defendant's land for many years, long
enough to create a presumption of antiquity, the sprat fishing industry
was a mere thirty-five years old and involved oiled nets that were
placed to dry on the land at a different time of year. 20 4 The defendant claimed that a custom that varied in practice from that used in
20 5
ancient times was void because of uncertainty.
197
198
199

200

[1904] 2 Ch.534, 535.

7 Q.B. 214 (1872).
3 L.R.-Q.B. at 507 (1868).
Mercer, [1904] 2 Ch. 534.

201
Although this study generally addresses nineteenth-century custom, early twentiethcentury cases are consistent with those of the nineteenth century.
202 Mercer, [1904] 2 Ch.at 535.
208
Id. at 552.
204 Id. at 535-36.

205

Id. at 549.
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The court held, however, that custom need not be invariable to
be valid. The Court noted that other aspects of custom involved some
uncertainty but were still good at law. By definition custom adheres to
a fluctuating class of persons that varies by number, yet custom is not
void by virtue of this uncertainty.2 0 6 In modem cases, the court observed, good custom is often alleged generally. In Fitch v. Rawling, for
example, although the charge was trespassing to play cricket (a game
of recent vintage), the court upheld a custom allowing "all the inhabitants of [the] parish to play.., in the close at all seasonable times
20 7
of the year."
The defendant in Mercer also claimed that the custom of spreading fishing nets on his land could not have existed since 1189 because
the land itself did not exist then, but was a result of recent accretion.
Good custom, he argued, combining the elements of antiquity and
certainty, must affect a definite locale.2 0 8 The court dismissed this argument by resort to property law and the rules governing the ownership of land that accretes, 20 9 but at least one Justice felt it necessary to
prove the ancient origins of the beach by reference to geological
2 10
surveys and the discovery by a contractor of Roman ruins.
Reasons of political economy and the foundation of custom in
use-rights that serve community interests underlie the Mercer court's
willingness to define the terms of the custom broadly enough to encompass modem innovations in the fishing industry. Changes in the
method of preparing the nets and the length of the sprat fishing season forced the landowner to give over his land to the fishermen for a
significantly greater part of the year.2 1 ' Nonetheless, the court held
that to limit the custom as it existed in 1189 A.D. "might result in
making an arrangement that was in its inception reasonable, because
of public benefit, become actually injurious to public interests ...
212
[because] all improvements and progress are debarred."
Nineteenth century courts readily admitted that the antiquity element of custom was a legal fiction.2 18 The foundation of this fiction
206 Id. at 552.
207 Id. at 553 (citing Fitch v. Rawling, 2 Hy. B1. 393, 126 Eng. Rep. 614 (C.P. 1795)).
The court here reasons by analogy. There is no evidence that the custom in Fitch was
challenged on grounds of antiquity.
208 Id. at 540.
209 Id. at 556-57; [1905] 2 Ch. at 582 (Stirling LJ.)
210 2 Ch. at 584 (Cozens-Hardy, LJ.).
211 Mercer, [1904] 2 Ch. at 536.
212 Id. at 552.
218 Hammerton v. Honey, 24 W.R. 603, 604 (Ch. 1876) ("I do not suppose anybody
imagines that in the case of...
custom that there has been from time immemorial a
common law of the particular place .... ."); Bryant v. Foot, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 497, 508 (Ex. 1868)
(accepting arguendo that in cases of custom, "neither judges nor juries have in reality believed... that customs found to be immemorial had actually existed in the time of Richard

I.").
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was a policy of the courts to quiet title and to protect long-established
use-rights. 214 Because customary uses were presumed to benefit the
community as a whole, the Mercer court did not need to treat the ancient legal custom as immutable, but could adapt it to modem condi2 15
tions for the benefit of all.
2.

Certainty

The traditional element of certainty in custom arose from the
concept of custom as a local exception to the common law of the
realm. The element of certainty ensured that local exceptions did not
swallow the common law rule.2 1 6 When custom was litigated at law in

the nineteenth century, the courts defined the element of certainty in
terms of positive legal rules. The redefined element of certainty required that custom lie in a definite district so as to "coincide with
217
some recognised jurisdiction."
Easement customs did not have to originate in the lord's courts
and could be claimed by any inhabitant of a district. But the courts,
having created an historical fiction of the democratic feudal manor,
disallowed custom when it could not have originated by grant of a
feudal lord. In Sowerby v. Coleman, for example, a custom of inhabitants to train horses outside of their parish in a neighboring manor
was invalid because the manor and parish were not co-extensive and
the custom was not "properly laid in the commencement."21 8 Likewise, when the inhabitants of three parishes joined forces to claim a
right of recreation in Edwards v. Jenkins, the court ruled that the claim
could not be maintained because such a right could not have
2 19
originated in the grant of a single lord.
The presumption of a custom's origin in the grant of a feudal
lord was the creation of eighteenth and nineteenth century judges
who sought the origins of custom in a mythic feudal past. In earlier
If we assume [that] ...neitherjudges norjuries have in reality believed that
... customs... actually existed in the time of Richard I., still, if this state of
the law, created by the judges to quiet titles, to protect rights derived from
long user or enjoyment, and so, to supply the want of a just and enlightened legislation, be established by these decisions, we must accept it as we
find it ....
Bryan4 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 508; see also supra note 119.
215
Mercer, [1904] 2 Ch. 534; [1905] 2 Ch. at 581 (Stirling, LJ.) ("those who are entitled
to the benefit of a custom ought not to be deprived of that benefit simply because they take
advantage of modem inventions or new operations, so long as they do not thereby throw
an unreasonable burden on the landowner").
216
See, e.g., Arthur v. Bokenham, 11 Mod. 148, 160, 88 Eng. Rep. 957, 962 (KB. 1708)
("[A]II customs which are against the common law of England, ought to be taken strictly,
nay very strictly, even stricter than any Act of Parliament that alters the common law").
217
Salt, supra note 1, at 293.
218
2 L.R.-Ex. 96, 100 (1867) (Channell, B.).
219
[1896] 1 Ch. 308,312-13 (1895).
214
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centuries, courts acknowledged that the origins of certain customs
had been lost to history.22 0 Lord Coke, in Gateward's Case, distinguished prescription, which required a lawful beginning by grant,
from custom precisely on the point of lawful origin.2 21 Custom, he
reasoned, cannot be said to have lawful origins because custom,
though reasonable, is by definition against the common law.2 22 In an
attempt to rationalize the origins of custom in a feudal grant, the
courts of the nineteenth century distorted the concept of custom. For
most rural customs alleged at law in the nineteenth century, there is
no record of their origin. The record of custom was evidence, however slim, of immemorial praxis.
3.

Reasonableness

The existence of custom was a question of fact for the jury2 2 and
it had to be demonstrated by the party asserting the custom. The burden of proving that a custom is unreasonable lay with those who challenged the custom 2 24 and was a question of law "for the judges of the
2 25
land to determine."
When courts addressed the element of reasonableness in easement custom, they upheld customs that served the good of the community, often in derogation of the rights or interests of the individual.
In Tyson v. Smith, for example, an action in trespass was brought
against a victualler for entering the plaintiffs manor and setting up
booths, stalls and tables. In response, the defendant pled a custom
that:
every... victualler... hath [during certain times of the year] been

used and accustomed to enter.., upon that part of the said commons or waste grounds, from time to time appointed for holding
said fairs .

.

. and, for the more conveniently carrying on .

.

. said

trade... to erect a booth and stall, and to put and place posts and
tables there, and to keep ... the said booth, stall, posts, and tables
so erected... until a reasonable time after the last of the said fairs,
220 See, e.g., Pain v. Patrick, 3 Mod. 289, 293, 87 Eng. Rep. 191, 194 (KB. 1690) (the
origins of gavelkind and borough English are unknown).
221
6 Co. Rep. 59b, 60b, 77 Eng. Rep. 344, 345-46 (K.B. 1607).
222 Id. ("[E]very prescription ought to have by common intendment a lawful beginning, but otherwise it is of a custom; for that ought to be reasonable... but need not be
intended to have a lawful beginning... These and the like customs are reasonable, but by
common intendment they cannot have a lawful beginning. . ."); see Hix v. Gardiner, 2
Bulst. 195, 196, 80 Eng. Rep. 1062, 1063 (KB. 1614) ("M ou cannot imagine the reason of
a custom, the custom of borough English and gavelkinde, are no reasonable customs, the
reason to be shewed of the beginning of them is impossible").
223 Bastard v. Smith, 2 M. & Ros. 129, 174 Eng. Rep. 238 (Q.B. 1837).
224 ALLEN, supra note 3, at 95.
225 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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yielding and paying therefore to the lord the sum of 2d., when law22 6
fully demanded.
The lord in Tyson challenged the custom on three grounds: the
generality of its applicability to all victuallers, the impossibility of its
execution in practice, due to its general application, and the allegation that the custom amounted to a profit in alieno solo in another's
2 27
land and therefore could not be sustained as a customary right.
The prescriptive right of the fair was admitted in the pleadings,
leaving only the existence of the custom in dispute. The jury at the
Cumberland Assize found that the custom existed in fact; the plaintiff
22 8
challenged the reasonableness of the custom at law.
In keeping with the theory that custom arises from the consent of
the community, the court stated that a custom can not be deemed
unreasonable simply because it prejudices the interests of one man for
the greater benefit of the community.2 29 According to the court, not
only was custom good at law despite its being prejudicial to the interests of a single individual, 23 0 but the benefit of a custom inuring to the
community rather than an individual actually "renders [the] lawful
231
commencement [of the custom] reasonably probable."
A valid local custom can only inure to the benefit of a class of
persons in a particular district, because to grant the right to all the
subjects of the realm would create common law, not /ex oci.232 The
court held that the term "victualler" should be defined with reference
to its meaning at the time of pleading, which made the custom sufficiently narrow, applying only to those licensed by law to have houses
23 3
of entertainment.
The lord also argued that the number of victuallers was so large
that to allow the custom could mean that the entire fair would be
taken over by houses of entertainment. The court doubted that this
would happen and noted that when judging the reasonableness of
custom a court must look to the "probabilities of the case, and be
satisfied that the inconvenience is real, general, and extensive" before
they declared that a custom, which ajury has found to exist from time
2 34
out of memory, was void.
226
227
228
229

9 A. & E. 406, 112 Eng. Rep. 1265 (Ex. Ch. 1838).
Id. at 422-23, 112 Eng. Rep. at 1272.
Id. at 419-20, 112 Eng. Rep. at 1271.
Id. at 421, 112 Eng. Rep. at 1271.

230

Id.

Mercer v. Denne, [1904] 2 Ch. 534, 552, afd, [1905] 2 Ch. 538 (CA).
Thus, the right to play cricket on the lord's land is vested in the inhabitants of the
community but not in any of the crown's subjects who happen to be in the parish. Fitch v.
Rawling, 2 Hy. BI. 393, 126 Eng. Rep. 614 (C.P. 1795).
233
Tyson, 9 A. & E. at 423, 112 Eng. Rep. at 1272.
234 Id. at 424, 112 Eng. Rep. at 1272. The results in this case can be profitably compared to those in Wilson v. Willes, 7 East 121, 103 Eng. Rep. 46 (KB. 1806), where the
231
232
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Finally, the court addressed the lord's claim that the right consti23 5
tuted a profit in alieno solo, which could not be asserted by custom.
The court found that the custom provided for the compensation of
the landowner (even if 2 shillings was not full compensation). In addition, at its inception, the custom was a benefit to the lord because it
encouraged strangers to come to the fair and buy wares.23 6 Finding
that the agreement had been evidenced by "repeated acts of assent on
both sides from the earliest times, beginning before time of memory
and continuing down to our own times," the court declared the custom good and affirmed the judgment of the Queen's Bench in favor
23 7
of the defendant.
In Tyson, the court also applied theories of consent, community
benefit and contract to uphold custom. Having found the custom to
benefit the community, the court manipulated the concept of reasonableness. The term victualler was defined at the time of pleading,
while the rationale and terms of compensation were defined in relation to the origins of medieval market practice. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the same judge who rejected the claims of the
inhabitants in Lockwood v. Wood, who claimed an exemption from stallage fees by grant, affirmed the indefinite class of "all victuallers" and
the token compensation of two shillings to the lord. The court would
not interfere where a custom had demonstrated its benefit to the community, adopting the belief that reasonableness is utility.23 8
When nineteenth century courts adjudged the reasonableness or
certainty of rural customs at common law, they accorded custom a
fictional beginning in the feudal court with the consent of the copyholders. This approach narrowed the inquiry into the reasonableness
of custom, but may also have resulted in otherwise valid customs being
held void for uncertainty because they were not laid in a single manor.
Customs that favored the single landowner over the interests of his
tenants were unreasonable. Good custom issued from a community
with the consent of its members.

court rejected for indefiniteness and uncertainty the alleged custom of tenants' unrestricted right to turbary of the common.
235 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
236 Tyson, 9 A. & E. at 425, 112 Eng. Rep. at 1273.
237 Id. at 425-26, 112 Eng. Rep. at 1273.
238
One commentator has argued that Chief Justice Tindall went "further than the
authorities perhaps warranted." Salt, supra note 1, at 285. Yet, Tindall was experienced in
the intricacies of custom litigation. I contend that this "error" was a result of defining
reasonableness in terms of "what made 'common sense'-crypto-utilitarianjudgments, one
might say, impregnated with a deep respect for established practice." W.R. CORNISH & G.
DE N. CLARK, LAW
-AN

SoclErY IN ENGLAND 1750-1950, at 70 (1989) (defining "reasonable-

ness" in nineteenth-century judgments).
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NOTE-CUSTOM AND THE COMMON LAW
CONCLUSION

Although Thompson argued that in the eighteenth century the
common law was a force of innovation that imposed capitalist definitions of property rights on traditional agrarian communities,2 39 our
examination of the nineteenth century suggests that the common law
regularly upheld customary rights and usages. The law was forced to
adapt to a market economy in which traditional subsistence use-rights
acquired new value. In some cases, the courts circumscribed customary rights in order to preserve communal resources.2 40 In others, they
invoked reasons of political economy to uphold modifications of genuinely ancient custom.

24 1

Nonetheless, far from being hostile to cus-

tom, nineteenth century courts created an historical fiction to give
24 2
custom legal origin.
It may be, as Thompson argued, that the common law aided in
the expropriation of the landless cottager in the eighteenth century.
His thesis is supported by cases like Bateson v. Green, which upheld the
lord's right to destroy the common. 243 The arbitrary power of lordship, however, was repudiated by the courts of the nineteenth century.244 Nineteenth century courts regularly upheld custom on the

grounds of utility: good custom was law established by common consent of the community members and operated for the greater good of
all.
The jurisprudence of custom was transformed by utilitarian theory and positivist conceptions of law. Lawmaking by judicial opinion
in the nineteenth century became increasingly rational and rulebased. Custom that was valid at common law in the nineteenth century was that which resembled positive law. An increasingly rational
and scientific judiciary redefined the elements of custom while setling disputes over customary property and use-rights in the context of
market demand for land and communal resources.
THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 137.
240 See, e.g., Wilson v. Willes, 7 East 121, 103 Eng. Rep. 46 (KB. 1806) (rejecting unlimited right of commoners' turbary, or the taking of turves and peats from the common, for
uncertainty, where individual commoner takes one hundred square yards of turf for
market).
241 See, e.g., Mercer v. Denne, [1904 2 Ch. 534, afftd, [1905] 2 Ch. 538 (CA.) (extending time during which fishermen by custom may dry nets on the owner's land to accommodate modem sprat fishing industry); Rogers v. Brenton, 10 Q.B. 25, 59, 116 Eng.
Rep. 10, 23-24 (Q.B. 1847) (jury finding that stannary (tin mining) custom to renew claim
to mine by annual renewal of boundary marks is good in fact, butjudges disallow it as "an
abuse of the original limits of the custom").
242
See supratext accompanying notes 185-87.
243 5 T.R. 411, 101 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B. 1793).
244 See, e.g., Hilton v. Granville (Earl), 5 Q.B. 701, 730, 114 Eng. Rep. 1414, 1425 (Q.B.
1845).
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As with much of legal history, the real story of the fate of custom
may lie in facts not revealed in the legal opinions written by nineteenth century judges. Further research is needed into the background of litigants and the value of the customary rights relative to
the national economy to determine the overall impact of custom cases
in the nineteenth century. While many customs were upheld, profits d
prendre that were exercised by inhabitants were litigated throughout
the nineteenth century, and the poor and landless continued to lose
customary use-rights as landowners put valuable land to more "profitable" use. Legitimate inhabitant customs were disallowed by the application of modem positivist notions of jurisdiction. With the
exception of traditional easements, those who did not hold a tenurial
interest were not aided by the presumptions of the Prescription Act.
Finally, the type of inhabitant customs that were upheld tended to
benefit those engaged in for-profit enterprise.
These caveats aside, custom remained a vital source of law
throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. As nineteenth century judges struggled to impose reason on an archaic system of landholding, and ancient customs of traditional communities
were stretched to their limits by the exigencies of a growing market
economy, the common law upheld customs that inured to the benefit
of the many over the few and affirmed the effectiveness of law "from
below" in regulating community resources.
Andrea C. Louxt

t This Note is a work in progress. The author is Lecturer-in-Law at Lancaster University, Lancaster, U.K. LA1 4YN. All comments are most welcome.
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